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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Benson Barrera appeals from a withheld judgment following a jury's guilty finding 
on a charge of aggravated assault. On appeal, he raises a number of claims, 
specifically asserting that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict; 
(2) the district court erred when it admitted 404(b) evidence that was irrelevant and 
unduly prejudicial; (3) the jury was improperly instructed as to the requisite mental state 
for aggravated assault; (4) the district court erred when it excluded, on relevance 
grounds, a defense expert on head-butting; (5) even if each error set forth in claims two, 
three, and four is individually harmless, together they constituted cumulative error 
necessitating reversal; and (6) the prosecutor committed misconduct constituting 
fundamental error when, during rebuttal closing argument, she personally attacked 
defense counsel and impugned the role of defense counsel in our system of justice. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
This case arose out of an encounter between Benson Barrera and Juan Carlos 
Ramirez. As a result of that encounter, Mr. Barrera was charged with aggravated 
assault. 1 (R., pp.229-30.) The matter proceeded to a jury trial, the relevant details of 
which are recounted below. 
The evidence established that Mr. Ramirez met Mr. Barrera as a result of 
Mr. Ramirez's then-wife, Scarlet Ramirez, engc1ging in an extra-marital affair with 
1 Mr. Barrera was initially charged with aggravated battery. (R., pp.65-68.) Later, after 
concluding that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Ramirez suffered permanent disfigurement, the State amended the charge to what it 
argued was the lesser-included charge of aggravated assault. (R., pp.156-57, pp.229-
30.) 
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Mr. Barrera. Ms. Ramirez and Mr. Barrera met through their work at the Ada County 
Courthouse, where she was a court clerk and he was a public defender. That affair, 
which lasted "(o]ff and on for, maybe, five, six months," started one year before the 
encounter giving rise to the charge in this case. Ms. Ramirez told her husband about 
the affair shortly after it started, and they divorced shortly thereafter (Tr.,2 p.215, L.1 -
p.217, L.25, p.374, Ls.16-19.) 
Mr. Ramirez testified that he first encountered Mr. Barrera in person 3 about a 
month after the divorce, when he confronted Mr. Barrera about the affair. The 
encounter became rather "heated," with Mr. Ramirez "getting upset because of the 
whole situation." Less than a month later, they ran into each other again, and had 
another tense encounter. They did not see or talk to each other again until the night of 
the incident in this case. (Tr., p.377, L.18 - p.384, L.12.) 
The encounter giving rise to this case began a little after 2 a.m. when 
Mr. Ramirez and his friends ran into Mr. Barrera and his friends at Chronic Taco in 
downtown Boise. (Tr., p.384, L.17 - p.386, L.24, p.677, L.9 - p.678, L.2.) Both 
Mr. Barrera and Mr. Ramirez had spent the preceding several hours drinking at various 
establishments in downtown Boise. (Tr., p.429, L.3 - p.435, L.18, p.666, L.8 - p.670, 
L.7.) Both men acknowledged engaging in a shouting match, which only ended when 
the manager of Chronic Taco threatened to call the police, at which point Mr. Ramirez's 
friends pulled him out of the restaurant. (Tr., p.386, L.16 - p.395, L.2, p.678, L.3 -
p.683, L.5.) As a result of a particularly crude comment made by Mr. Barrera during 
that shouting match, his date that night, Margery Jacobsen and a friend of hers, walked 
2 References to the transcript volume containing the trial proceedings will be to "Tr." 
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out on him. (Tr., p.305, L. p.312, L.17.) After Mr. Ramirez left, Mr. Barrera 
remained in the restaurant for five to ten minutes, with his remaining companions, and 
finished his food. (Tr., p.683, Ls.15-22.) 
Both men testified that they next encountered each other in the street near a 
parking lot not far from Chronic Taco. (Tr., p.399, L.5 - p.400, L.16, p.686, L.6 - p.689, 
L.15.) That is where their accounts diverge. According to Mr. Ramirez, he was walking 
along when, 
I actually, kind of, more or less, brushed up with him.[4] And he said 
something to the effect, "She liked it," another just a comment, rude 
comment about my ex. And so we get into it, as pretty much standing as I 
am right now, in front of him. He's there, he's about 4 feet away from me. 
He's going on about, "Okay, let's do this. Let's do this." 
And so I'm standing there with my hands apart. It's during the winter. 
Yeah, because I had a coat on, and I had a shirt. 
So he lunged out for me. Before he lunged out, I saw him take his coat 
off. Took his coat off.[5] You could see he was just enraged. Oh, I had 
made a comment about - something about his baseball career,[6] you 
know, just nudged at him, and so he got mad, for whatever reason at that 
[Mr. Ramirez was then asked if he remembered what he had said about 
Mr. Barrera's baseball career.] 
3 Mr. Ramirez testified that he first spoke with Mr. Barrera when he called him shortly 
after learning of the affair. During that call he asked Mr. Barrera to stop seeing his wife 
until their divorce became final. (Tr., p.373, L. 18 - p.374, L.10.) 
4 Mr. Ramirez's friend of fifteen years, Robert Sanchez, testified that a still-angry 
Mr. Ramirez saw Mr. Barrera and said, 'There he is," before bypassing the parking lot 
and approaching Mr. Barrera. (Tr., p.521, L.21 - p.524, L.6.) Jeremy McGinnis, 
Mr. Barrera's friend, who was acting as the designated driver that night, testified that he 
first noticed Mr. Ramirez and his friends when they were 150 feet away. He noticed that 
Mr. Ramirez's two friends "were trying to deter him, I guess you could say, from coming 
into our direction." (Tr., p.570, L.21 - p.574, L.6.) 
5 Mr. Sanchez testified that he did not see Mr. Barrera remove his coat. (Tr., p.523, 
Ls.23-25.) Mr. McGinnis testified that he never saw Mr. Barrera take off his coat, and 
that Mr. Barrera still had it on when Mr. Ramirez initiated physical contact with 
Mr. Barrera by grabbing his jacket. (Tr., p.576, L.16 - p.577, L.3.) 
6 Mr. Barrera played collegiate baseball at the University of Utah. (Tr., p.722, Ls.16-20.) 
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Yeah. I think I called him a loser ... [he] didn't make it anywhere. So he 
threw his coat off, lunged at me with his right hand, grabbed at my shirt. 
He missed the first time, but then he quickly grabbed me by the neck, and 
he head-butted me. 
(Tr., p.400, L.17- p.401, L.15.) 
According to Mr. Barrera, he was walking down the street sending text messages 
when one of his friends told him that Mr. Ramirez and his friends were down the street. 
He looked up from texting and saw Mr. Ramirez approaching quickly. Mr. Ramirez 
began yelling profanities at him when they were still about twenty feet away from each 
other, and that Mr. Ramirez approached him within two feet before they were "in each 
other's face[s]," at which time they were both yelling at each other. Mr. Ramirez then 
grabbed Mr. Barrera by the neck of his jacket. Mr. Barrera reacted by grabbing onto 
Mr. Ramirez's shirt as a way of "evening things out." Neither of them threw a punch. At 
that point, some of the people around got involved, got behind both of them, and tried to 
pull them apart. This caused Mr. Barrera to lose his balance. In an attempt to regain 
his balance Mr. Barrera tried to pull free of the people pulling him which caused him to 
be "ripped away from that force from behind me and ripped forward," the result of which 
was that he hit his head on something. 7 (Tr., p.689, L.12 - p.690, L.24.) 
Clay Barnes, the emergency room physician who treated Mr. Ramirez, testified 
that when a head-butt is executed "[w]ith the right force applied, it can be life-
threatening."8 When asked by the State if "a head-butt is the kind of mechanism that is 
likely to cause great bodily harm," Dr. Barnes replied, "Absolutely." (Tr., p.278, Ls.20-25 
(emphasis added).) During cross-examination, Dr. Barnes stated that the "mechanism 
7 Mr. Barrera explained, on cross-examination, that he assumes that his head hit 
Mr. Ramirez's head. (Tr., p.699, Ls.8-16.) 
8 Dr. Barnes acknowledged that he has never witnessed a head-butt being executed. 
(Tr., p.286, Ls.14-19.) 
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[of a head-butt] has that potential [to cause great bodily injury]." (Tr., p.291, Ls.19-24 
(emphasis added).) On re-direct, Dr. Barnes explained that "[w]ithout seeing the 
mechanism of the injury, it's challenging to know" whether Mr. Ramirez experienced a 
significant, direct blunt force. (Tr., p.293, Ls.11-17.) The district court did not allow 
Mr. Barrera to call a proffered expert witness on martial arts who would have testified, 
inter a/ia, that not all types of head-butts are executed in a manner likely to cause great 
bodily injury. (10/5/11 Tr., p.37, L.21 - p.50, L.23.) 
Prior to the jury deliberating, Mr. Barrera requested that the jury be instructed 
that, in order to be found guilty of aggravated assault, the State was required to prove 
that he acted intentionally. Specifically, defense counsel requested that the word 
"intentionally" be inserted before the word "unlawfully" in what were ultimately given as 
Instruction Nos. 3, 11, and 12.9 (Jury Inst. Tr., p.61, L.8-p.62, L.10.) The district court 
declined to instruct the jury that Mr. Barrera was required to have any intent, adopting 
the State's argument that aggravated assault, as it was charged against Mr. Barrera 
was not a specific intent crime. (Jury Inst. Tr., p.62, L.11 - p.63, L.19.) 
Ultimately, the jury was instructed on aggravated assault as follows: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Aggravated Assault, the state 
must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about January 16, 2011[,] 
2. in the state of Idaho, 
3. the defendant Benson Barrera unlawfully attempted, with apparent 
ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of Juan Carlos Ramirez, 
4. by head-butting the victim, and 
9 Instruction No. 3 was a recitation of the language of the charge contained in the 
charging instrument. (R., p.282; Tr., p.185, L.21 - p.187, L.2.) Instruction Nos. 11 and 
12 were the instructions for aggravated assault and simple assault, respectively. 
(R., pp.292-93; Tr., p.779, L.4 - p.780, L.7.) 
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5. the defendant committed that assault by a means or force likely to 
produce great bodily harm. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
(R., p.292, Tr., p.779, Ls.4-17.) 
During deliberations, the jury asked the following question, "Regarding Instruction 
No. 11: To prove aggravated assault, does the state need to show that the defendant 
intended to commit an assault likely to produce great bodily harm? In other words, does 
the defendant's intent apply to the phrase 'likely to cause great bodily harm'?" (Jury 
Question Tr., p.91, Ls.6-13.) The district court answered the question as follows: 
Answer: The criminal intent which is required is the general intent to 
wilfully [sic] commit an act the direct, natural and probable consequences 
of which if successfully completed would be the injury to another. The 
intent to cause any particular injury is not necessary. It is for you to 
decide if there was an assault and if it was done by a means or force likely 
to produce great bodily harm. 
(Juror Question to Judge During Deliberation (augmentation).) 
Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Barrera guilty of aggravated assault (R., p.308), 
and the district court granted him a withheld judgment. (R., pp.316-17.) Mr. Barrera 
filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the entry of the withheld judgment. (R., p.322.) 
6 
ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence presented sufficient to establish Mr. Barrera's guilt on the 
charge of aggravated assault? 
2. Did the district court err when it improperly instructed the jury as to the requisite 
mental state for aggravated assault? 
3. Did the district court err when it admitted two irrelevant and prejudicial text 
messages over Mr. Barrera's objection? 
4. Did the district court err when it excluded, on relevance grounds, a defense 
expert on head-butting? 
5. Is Mr. Barrera entitled to a new trial under the cumulative error doctrine? 
6. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, constituting fundamental error in violation 
of Mr. Barrera's due process right to a fair trial, when she insulted the function of 




The Evidence Presented Was Insufficient To Establish Mr. Barrera's Guilt On The 
Charge Of Aggravated Assault 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Barrera asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support 
a conviction for aggravated assault. At most, the evidence established a simple assault 
and / or battery. As such, this Court should vacate his conviction for aggravated 
assault, order that a judgment of acquittal be entered as to that charge, and remand this 
matter to the district court for a new trial on any lesser-included charges that the State 
wishes to pursue. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review for an appellate court regarding the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain a conviction was set forth in State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 823 
(Ct. App. 1992), in which the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that: 
A conviction will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence upon 
which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, we construe all facts, 
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, in favor of upholding the 
jury's verdict. Where there is competent although conflicting evidence to 
sustain the verdict, we will not reweigh the evidence or disturb the verdict. 
Id. (citations omitted). "For evidence to be substantial, it must be of sufficient quality 
that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion." State v. Johnson, 131 Idaho 
808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 586 
(1996)). 
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C. The Evidence Presented Was Insufficient To Establish Mr. Barrera's Guilt On 
The Charge Of Aggravated Assault 
Mr. Barrera was charged with aggravated assault, in violation of Idaho 
Code§§ 18-901 (a) and 905(b), alleged to have been committed as follows: 
That the Defendant, BENSON BARRERA, on or about the 15th day of 
January 2011, at "Chronic Taco" on 5th Street in Boise, did unlawfully and 
with apparent ability, attempt to commit a violent injury upon the person of 
Juan Carlos Ramirez by a means likely to produce great bodily harm, to-
wit: by head-butting the victim with force great enough to necessitate 
stitches above the victim's left eye. 
(R., pp.229-30.) 
Idaho Code § 18-905, in relevant part, provides, "An aggravated assault is an 
assault ... [b]y any means or force likely to produce great bodily harm." I.C. § 18-
905(b). Idaho Code § 18-901, in relevant part, provides, "An assault is ... [a]n unlawful 
attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of 
another .... " I.C. § 18-901 (a). 
The State presented evidence that Mr. Barrera's head struck Mr. Ramirez's head 
during a heated argument. Mr. Ramirez testified that the strike was a willful head-butt. 
(Tr., p.401, L.11 - p.407, L.5.) As a result of that strike, Mr. Ramirez sustained a cut to 
his eyebrow, necessitating "the equivalent of 7 to 10 stitches." (Tr., p.283, Ls.1-8.) 
According to Clay Barnes, the emergency room physician who treated Mr. Ramirez, 
when a head-butt is executed "[w]ith the right force applied, it can be life-threatening." 
When asked by the State if "a head-butt is the kind of mechanism that is likely to cause 
great bodily harm," Dr. Barnes replied, "Absolutely." (Tr., p.278, Ls.20-25 (emphasis 
added).) During cross-examination, Dr. Barnes stated that the "mechanism [of a head-
butt] has that potential [to cause great bodily injury]." (Tr., p.291, Ls.19-24 (emphasis 
added).) On re-direct, Dr. Barnes explained that "[w]ithout seeing the mechanism of the 
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injury, it's challenging to know" whether Mr. Ramirez experienced a significant, direct 
blunt force. (Tr., p.293, Ls.11-17.) 
The State also presented testimony from an ex-girlfriend of Mr. Barrera, to rebut 
his testimony that his contact with Mr. Ramirez was accidental. She testified that he 
once told her "that if some dudes ever got brave with him that he would just head-butt 
him, and he said they would never see it coming, and you can't defend against it." He 
went on to note that "he would just have to be careful that he didn't break the guy's jaw 
or anything because he didn't want it to be a felony. He was fine with a misdemeanor, 
but he didn't want a felony." (Tr., p.756, L.14 - p.757, L.1.) 
Dr. Barnes' testimony concerning the potential for injury from a generic head-butt 
was not sufficient to establish that the head-butt alleged to have been executed in this 
case was the type that was likely to cause great bodily harm. He acknowledged that the 
"mechanism" of a head-butt "has the potential" to cause great bodily harm, and that 
when a head-butt is executed "[w]ith the right force applied, it can be life-threatening." 
Dr. Barnes also testified that "[w]ithout seeing the mechanism of the injury, it's 
challenging to know" whether it resulted from significant direct blunt force. It is 
important to note that Dr. Barnes was not asked whether the means alleged in this 
case, a head-butt executed "with force great enough to necessitate stitches above the 
victim's left eye," was likely to cause great bodily harm. 
Dr. Barnes' testimony can hardly be said to represent substantial competent 
evidence from which a jury could have concluded that the head-butt purportedly 
executed by Mr. Barrera constituted "a means likely to produce great bodily harm .... " 
When coupled with the State's evidence that Mr. Barrera purportedly planned to 
execute any such head-butt carefully enough not to cause the type of injury that would 
10 
constitute a felony it can hardly be said that the State presented sufficient competent 
evidence to support the jury's finding that the head-butt in this case was a means likely 
to cause great bodily harm. It is worth nothing that the State has previously argued that 
conduct that included head-butting "did not rise to the level of an aggravated assault or 
other heinous conduct as required by Section 19-202A[1°] .... " See State v. McNeil, 
141 Idaho 383, 384-85 (Ct. App. 2005). 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Barrera asserts that the State did not 
present substantial competent evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict as to the 
aggravated assault charge. As such, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the 
withheld judgment, order that a judgment of acquittal be entered on the charge, and 
remand this matter to the district court for the State to elect whether to pursue the 
lesser-included charges of simple assault and/ or battery. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Improperly Instructed The Jury As To The Requisite 
Mental State For Aggravated Assault 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Barrera asserts that the district court erred when it improperly instructed the 
jury as to the requisite mental state for aggravated assault in response to a jury 
question. Because the district court's answer to the jury's question lessened the State's 
burden of proof and violated Mr. Barrera's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 
10 Idaho Code§ 19-202A provides immunity from prosecution for any person who uses 
"reasonable means" to protect himself or another "whom he reasonably believes to be in 
imminent danger of or the victim of aggravated assault, robbery, rape, murder or other 
heinous crime." I.C. § 19-202A. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which Idaho 
appellate courts exercise free review. Such a review requires an examination of the jury 
instructions as a whole because "[a]n erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible 
error unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." State v. 
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88 (2011) (citations omitted). Jury instructions which 
include an improper instruction on an element of the offense violate the Sixth 
Amendment's jury trial guarantee. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Improperly Instructed The Jury As To The 
Requisite Mental State For Aggravated Assault 
Mr. Barrera requested that the jury be instructed that, in order to be found guilty 
of aggravated assault, the State was required to establish that he acted with the intent 
to cause injury to Mr. Ramirez. Specifically, defense counsel requested that the word 
"intentionally" be inserted before the word "unlawfully" in what were ultimately given as 
Instruction Nos. 3, 11, and 12. 11 (Jury Inst. Tr., p.61, L.8 - p.62, L.10.) The district 
court declined to instruct the jury that Mr. Barrera was required to have such an intent, 
relying on the State's argument that aggravated assault, as it was charged against 
Mr. Barrera was not a specific intent crime. (Jury Inst. Tr., p.62, L.11 - p.63, L.19.) 
Initially the jury was instructed on aggravated assault as follows: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Aggravated Assault, the state 
must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about January 16, 2011 [,] 
11 Instruction No. 3 contained the language of the charge taken from the Amended 
Information (R., p.282; Tr., p.185, L.21 - p.187, L.2.) Instruction Nos. 11 and 12 were 
the instructions for aggravated assault and simple assault, respectively. (R., pp.292-93; 
Tr., p.779, L.4 - p.780, L.7.) 
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2. in the state of Idaho, 
3. the defendant Benson Barrera unlawfully attempted, with apparent 
ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of Juan Carlos Ramirez, 
4. by head-butting the victim, and 
5. the defendant committed that assault by a means or force likely to 
produce great bodily harm. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
(R., p.292, Tr., p.779, Ls.4-17.) 
During deliberations, the jury submitted the following question, "Regarding 
Instruction No. 11: To prove aggravated assault, does the state need to show that the 
defendant intended to commit an assault likely to produce great bodily harm? In other 
words, does the defendant's intent apply to the phrase 'likely to cause great bodily 
harm'?" (Jury Question Tr., p.91, Ls.6-13.) Defense counsel objected to answering the 
jury's question. (Jury Question Tr., p.92, L.8 p.97, L.24.) Ultimately, the district court 
answered the question as follows: 
Answer: The criminal intent which is required is the general intent to 
wilfully [sic] commit an act the direct, natural and probable consequences 
of which if successfully completed would be the injury to another. The 
intent to cause any particular injury is not necessary. It is for you to 
decide if there was an assault and if it was done by a means or force likely 
to produce great bodily harm. 
(Juror Question to Judge During Deliberation (augmentation).) 
The language used by the district court was taken from State v. Bonaparte, 114 
Idaho 577 (Ct. App. 1988). Bonaparte concerned whether a defendant should have 
been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to aggravated assault based on his claim that 
he was not informed that the offense required proof of a specific intent In describing 
the elements necessary to establish an aggravated assault, the Court noted that 
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specific intent to cause great bodily harm was not necessary, and "when entering his 
plea, Bonaparte need only have understood that the state was required to prove he 
intended to cause harm when firing his rifle .... " Bonaparte, 114 Idaho at 580 
(emphasis added). In Mr. Barrera's case, rather than expressing this practical 
application of the Court's holding in a jury instruction, the district court chose to read a 
an instruction based on material from a California case quoted in Bonaparte, in which 
the California Supreme Court explained, 
"We conclude that the criminal intent which is required ... is the general 
intent to wilfully [sic] commit an act the direct, natural and probable 
consequences of which if successfully completed would be the injury to 
another ... The intent to cause any particular injury, to severely injure 
another, or to injury in the sense of inflicting bodily harm is not necessary." 
Id. (quoting People v. Rocha, 479 P.2d 372, 376-77 (Cal. 1971) (internal citations 
omitted). 
The difference between the language of the Court's holding in Bonaparte and the 
California Supreme Court's quoted holding in Rocha is obvious: in Bonaparte, the Court 
concluded that the State was required to prove an intent to cause harm, while in Rocha, 
the Court concluded that "[t]he intent to cause ... injury in the sense of inflicting bodily 
harm is not necessary." By subtly removing the requirement that the State establish 
that, in order to be guilty of aggravated assault (or simple assault, for that matter), 
Mr. Barrera intended to cause some injury to Mr. Ramirez, not necessarily great bodily 
harm, the district court relieved the State of proof of the requisite mental state of the 
offense. 
In a case involving a similar initial instruction, State v. Broadhead, 139 Idaho 663 
(Ct. App. 2004), the Court considered whether the jury was properly instructed as to the 
intent required for aggravated assault. Ultimately, the Court accepted the State's 
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argument that the word "attempted" incorporated the intent to cause an injury, 
concluding, 
[T]he jury was instructed that Broadhead made an effort to do, accomplish 
or effect a violent injury upon the three boys. We can discern no 
possibility of this being interpreted as anything other than an intentional 
act upon the part of Broadhead. Therefore, the jury was properly 
instructed to find an element of intentional action, and the jury instruction 
was not erroneous. 
Broadhead, 139 Idaho at 666-67. While the jury in Mr. Barrera's case was initially 
instructed consistently with what the Court found acceptable in Broadhead, which 
implied, through the word "attempted," the necessity of proof of an intent to cause injury, 
the later instruction, in response to the jury's question, eliminated this implication, and 
improperly informed the jury that it could convict Mr. Barrera in the absence of any 
intent to cause injury. As such, even assuming that the instruction in Broadhead, a 
version of which was initially given in this case, is an accurate statement of the law, 12 
the district court's response to the jury question modified the instruction to remove the 
requisite mental state, thereby lightening the State's burden of proof in violation of 
Mr. Barrera's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 
111. 
The District Court Erred When It Admitted Two Irrelevant And Prejudicial Text 
Messages Over Mr. Barrera's Objection 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Barrera asserts that the district court erred when it admitted two text 
messages that he sent to Ms. Ramirez, shortly before the altercation with Mr. Ramirez, 
12 The Court of Appeals has, in dicta, questioned whether the holding in Bonaparte, that 
no specific intent to cause serious bodily injury is required to be proven to establish an 
aggravated assault, and asked the Idaho Supreme Court to provide "[c]larfication" on 
the question. See State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 46-47 (Ct. App. 2000). 
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because they were irrelevant, and assuming, arguendo, that they were minimally 
relevant, they were unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 and constituted impermissible 
character evidence in violation of Rule 404. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Admitted Two Irrelevant And Prejudicial Text 
Messages Over Mr. Barrera's Objection 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404, in relevant part, provides: 
(a) Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Evidence of a pertinent trait of the accused's character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same 
(b) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that the prosecution 
in a criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, 
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of 
the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
I.RE. 404. Evidence that is offered under Rule 404 is subject to the balancing test 
enumerated in Rule 403. I.RE. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... "); 
see also State v. Arledge, 119 Idaho 584, 588 (Ct. App. 1991 ). 
The State sought to introduce what it classified as 404(b) evidence consisting of 
text messages sent by Mr. Barrera to Ms. Ramirez in the hours preceding the incident in 
this case. (R, pp.105-08.) There were six messages in total, admitted as State's 
Exhibit Nos. 6 to 11, only three of which were objected to by defense counsel. 
(Tr., p.220, L.20 - p.221, L.5, p.228, Ls.19-20.) Of those three, Mr. Barrera only claims 
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error in the admission of two of the messages. The two messages to which he assigns 
error were admitted as State's Exhibit Nos. 10 and 11. State's Exhibit No. 10 reads, 
"You blow," and State's Exhibit I\Jo. 11 reads, "Want to fuck?"13 (State's Exhibit Nos. 10 
and 11.) 
Initially, the State argued that State's Exhibit No. 11 was relevant because it 
represents "the state's theory of the case" which is that Mr. Barrera is "the alpha male 
that gets the woman and commits acts of violence." The district court inquired as to 
how a message directed toward Ms. Ramirez that did not mention her ex-husband had 
anything to do with Mr. Barrera's attitude about Mr. Ramirez. The State explained that 
Mr. Barrera's "thinking to the victim in this case is inseparable from his thinking towards 
her [Ms. Ramirez]," before explaining that it was relevant because Mr. Barrera was out 
on a date at the time that he sent the text message, and that minutes after the 
altercation, he sent a text message to his date saying, "Well I'm really sorry about that. 
Will you come home with me?" According to the State, "He's the alpha male. He's 
trying to have sex 20 minutes before he head-butts Carlos. He head-butts Carlos. He's 
trying to have sex 10 minutes afterwards. It's all part of who he is." (Tr., p.228, L.25 -
p.230, L.6.) 
Defense counsel responded by noting, "[T]his is exactly the character zone 
where we were l1eaded to. This alpha male thing is an attempt to characterize my client 
as a violent, nasty, vile, filthy fellow, and it has nothing to do, and has no probative 
value, on what happened in the parking lot between these two gentlemen." Defense 
13 The State specifically referenced the "You blow" and "Want to fuck?" text messages 
in its 404(b) notice. (R., p.106 n.2.) 
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counsel closed by explaining that State's Exhibit No. 11 was "the first round in that 
attempted character assassination." (Tr., p.230, Ls.14-21.) 
The State responded to the character evidence argument by arguing that it was 
"not character evidence" because "these are the facts of the case . . . Character 
evidence is, this is what he did last week, the week before." (Tr., p.231, Ls.14-17.) 
Without addressing the character evidence argument, the district court sustained 
defense counsel's objections to State's Exhibit Nos. 10 and 11, noting that, even if they 
were relevant, "the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value." (Tr., p.233, Ls.6-9.) 
During the State's cross-examination of Mr. Barrera, the State again sought to 
introduce State's Exhibit Nos. 10 and 11. Defense counsel again objected, arguing that 
the exhibits were not relevant "and violative of the character prohibitions," and that 
State's Exhibit No. 11 was "extremely prejudicial" because it "suggest[s] ... that my 
client is a womanizer and is carrying on with two women, simultaneously 
(Tr., p.729, L.19 - p.731, L.3.) The State responded by arguing, 
I'm not offering these texts to show that he's a womanizer. I don't 
think he was trying to have sex with Scarlet Ramirez that night. I, 
certainly, wouldn't argue that; that's not the purpose. The purpose is to 
show that he has Carlos on his mind, and he's the one that persists. He 
keeps after it. He blames Carlos for what happened, but nobody's texting 
him. Defense counsel argues there were no texts from Scarlet Ramirez in 
response. That is exactly the point. No one is texting him, but he keeps 
after it. 
I don't think that there is any prejudicial value that is unfair, which is 
the test under 403, the danger of unfair prejudice. I certainly think it's 
prejudicial, but there's nothing unfair about it .... 
(Tr., p.732, L.24-p.733, L.12.) 
The district court ultimately ruled that the exhibits could be admitted, explaining, 
So it goes to his credibility. I mean, he's telling the jurors, you 
know, I want to hang out with Margery [the woman with whom he was on a 
date]. I want to be with her, and at the same time he's texting somebody 
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else. So there's some - there's a credibility issue there as well. And so 
the text to Margery has a tendency to impeach, you know, his credibility. 
From the state's point of view, the defendant's state of mind, they 
also want to show by this that he - in the text that he texted to 
Ms. Ramirez was that he did have Carlos on his mind. I mean the state's 
theory of the case is Mr. Barrera was the instigator, at least I think so. I 
don't want to mischaracterize what the state's case is. 
So as this case has progressed, you know my initial ruling was that 
I felt that the prejudicial nature of it outruled [sic] any relevancy. But as 
this case progressed, then I find, you know, based on all the testimony I've 
heard up to date, that Exhibits 10 and 11, I believe, become more 
relevant They're more relevant in terms of also corroboration of 
Mr. Ramirez' testimony about the relationship between the defendant and 
his ex-wife. 
(Tr., p.734, L.25 p.735, L.22.) 
The district court's analysis is flawed for a number of reasons, not the least of 
which is that it failed to consider the 404(a)(1) claim. Defense counsel argued that the 
exhibits were the sort of character evidence that was not permitted to be offered under 
the Rules of Evidence. The State argued, initially, that the texts proved that Mr. Barrera 
was "the alpha male that gets the woman and commits acts of violence." (Tr., p.229, 
Ls.4-5.) The State also argued that the texts were relevant to show that Mr. Barrera 
was trying to have sex with two different women in the minutes before and after the 
incident, which is "all part of who he is." (Tr., p.230, Ls.3-6.) The State later argued that 
the exhibits demonstrate that he "persists" and "keeps after it" in contacting 
Ms. Ramirez and they show that "[hJe blames Carlos for what happened." (Tr., p.733, 
Ls.2-8.) Under Rule 404(a)(1 ), the State is not permitted to introduce evidence of a 
pertinent character trait of a defendant except to rebut a claim about such a character 
trait made by the defendant. I.RE. 404(a)(1 ). 
Mr. Barrera did not put a trait of his character at issue, let alone make the 
assertion that he was a good boyfriend rather than a cad. In fact, he candidly testified 
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that the reason that his date left during the initial confrontation at Chronic Taco was 
because, during the shouting match with Mr. Ramirez, he said, '"You're mad because 
we tag-teamed your ex-wife' or something like that." (Tr., p.708, Ls.9-14.) He also 
testified that Mr. Ramirez's mention of the affair with Ms. Ramirez in front of his date 
caused him to be "embarrassed ... that I had broken his home." (Tr., p.681, Ls.1-6.) 
The remaining problems are that, assuming it was not character evidence 
prohibited under 404(a)(1 ), the evidence was not relevant for any of the reasons stated 
by the district court, and even assuming, arguendo, that they were minimally relevant, 
any such relevance was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice in admitting the 
exhibits. Specifically, the district court found the statements were relevant to impeach 
Mr. Barrera's testimony regarding his romantic intentions with his date that night, and to 
corroborate Mr. Ramirez's testimony as to the nature of the relationship between 
Mr. Barrera and his ex-wife. 
With respect to the relationship corroboration finding, it is worth considering the 
language of Rule 401, which describes relevant evidence as "evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
I.RE. 401. The testimony in this case makes it clear that the nature of Mr. Barrera's 
affair with Ms. Ramirez was neither in dispute nor a fact of consequence to the case. 
(Tr., p.215, L.1 - p.217, L.25 (Ms. Ramirez testifying concerning the affair); p.371, L.2 -
p.372, L.3 (Mr. Ramirez testifying that his wife acknowledged a relationship with 
someone who he later learned was Mr. Barrera, but that he didn't "know the exact 
details" because he "didn't want to know any more"); p.681, Ls.1-6 (Mr. Barrera 
acknowledging his embarrassment at his role in causing the break-up of Mr. Ramirez's 
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marriage); p.708, Ls.9-14 (Mr. Barrera acknowledging that he told Mr. Ramirez that he 
and a friend had together had sex with his wife).) 
With respect to impeaching Mr. Barrera's testimony concerning his intentions 
toward his date that night, even assuming that State's Exhibit No. 11 did that, it, too, 
was not relevant to a fact at issue in the case. It was the very sort of other act character 
evidence that is not admissible under Rule 404. See State v. Rupp, 118 Idaho 17, 19 
(Ct. App. 1990) (Rule 404 represents a "general prohibition against using specific acts 
to show character"). Even assuming that evidence that a person is attempting to be 
sexually-promiscuous by pursuing simultaneous sexual relationships with more than 
one person, it is unclear why that person's attempt to pursue two women at the same 
time, while none of the parties is married and with no evidence that the pursuer was 
misleading the women about being in a monogamous relationship, could be considered 
evidence relevant to that person's credibility. 
Furthermore, even assuming it was somehow minimally relevant, any such 
relevance was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. In State v. Clay, 
112 Idaho 261, 270 (Ct. App. 1987), the Court of Appeals considered the use of prior 
act evidence in a rape trial where the only issue in dispute was whether the sex was 
consensual. The prior act evidence was that the defendant made aggressive "passes" 
at several women shortly before the alleged rape of a different woman. Although the 
conviction was reversed and remanded on other grounds, the Court addressed the 
potential reintroduction of the prior act evidence on remand. In offering guidance to the 
district court, the Court "caution[ed] the trial judge that the evidence should not be 
admitted unless the prosecutor makes a stronger showing of probative value than the 
present record contains." Id. at 269-70. The Court explained that such evidence "would 
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contribute negligibly to an understanding of whether" the sex was consensual or 
forcible, and that "[c]onversely, the evidence would carry a high risk of unfair prejudice, 
portraying [him] as an undesirable character - a married man crudely seeking sexual 
liaisons with other women." Id. Similar to the facts of Clay, even if the evidence that 
Mr. Barrera was romantically-interested in more than one woman at the same time was 
marginally relevant, any such relevance carried a high risk of prejudice of showing that 
he is a cad and not a good person. State's Exhibit No. 10 consisted of nothing more 
than a crude insult directed at Ms. Ramirez, and serves only to show that Mr. Barrera is 
a person who insults women with whom he disagrees. 
Finally, with respect to the district court's finding that the two text messc1ges show 
Mr. Barrera's attitude toward Mr. Ramirez, Mr. Barrera notes that, even assuming that 
the two messages were relevant in that regard, their value was substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice. This is especially true in light of the fact that the State 
was able to introduce, without objection, several other text messages that clearly 
showed Mr. Barrera's feelings toward Mr. Ramirez. Those text messages, admitted as 
State's Exhibit Nos. 6, 7, and 8, all include insults about Mr. Ramirez, including claims 
that indicate that he is small and would not fare well in a physical confrontation with 
Mr. Barrera and his friends. (State's Exhibit Nos. 6, 7, and 8.) Given the wealth of 
alternative evidence for establishing Mr. Barrera's feelings toward Mr. Ramirez, and the 
at-best minimally relevant nature of the objected-to messages, any relevance was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that admitting such exhibits 
entailed, and should have been excluded under Rule 403. 
In short, the two exhibits offered over Mr. Barrera's objection were not relevant, 
represented impermissible character evidence, and even if they were minimally 
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relevant, any such relevance was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice to Mr. Barrera. Given the fact that the error was objected to, and the he-said, 
he-said nature of the case, it will be impossible for the State to establish that the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in order to avoid reversal. As such, 
1\11r. Barrera respectfully requests that this Court vacate the withheld judgment and 
remand this matter for a new trial at which such evidence will not be admitted. 
IV. 
The District Court Erred When It Excluded, On Relevance Grounds, A Defense Expert 
On Head-Butting 
A Introduction 
Mr. Barrera asserts that the district court erred when it concluded that the 
testimony of a proffered defense expert was not relevant and violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to call witnesses on his behalf and present a defense when it 
prevented him from calling that witness to testify as to the mechanics of head-butting 
and what types of head-butts are likely to cause great bodily harm. Because the 
proffered testimony was relevant to a fact of consequence at issue in this case, the 
district court's refusal to allow Mr. Barrera to call his expert witness was erroneous and 
deprived him of his Sixth Amendment rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 
816, 819 (Ct. App. 1993). The standard of review on issues of relevance is de nova. 
State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 218 (2000) (citations omitted). 
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C. The District Court Erred When It Excluded, On Relevance Grounds, A Defense 
Expert On Head-Butting 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
I.R.E. 401. Idaho Rule of Evidence 402 provides, "All relevant evidence is admissible 
except as otherwise provided by these rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of 
this state." I.R.E. 402. Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant evidence 
"may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." I.R.E. 
403. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part, 
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. AIVIEND. VI. "The 
Compulsory Process Clause grants a criminal defendant the right to call witnesses that 
are 'material and favorable to his defense."' Wong v. Money, 142 F.3d 313, 324-25 (6th 
Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Valnezue/a-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)). 
"[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish 
rules excluding evidence from criminal trial. Such rules do not abridge an accused's 
right to present a defense so long as they are not 'arbitrary' or 'disproportionate to the 
purposes they are designed to serve."' United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 
(1998) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987)). 
The State moved to exclude the testimony of Dan Embree, a proffered defense 
witness who is an expert in martial arts. The State took issue with Mr. Embree's 
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qualifications, and argued that his testimony "will not aid the trier of fact" and "will 
confuse the issues." (R., pp.183-85.) At a hearing on the State's motion, defense 
counsel provided an offer of proof regarding Mr. Embree's testimony, explaining, 
And what this man will testify to, Judge - I want to be very clear 
about this - is this is head-butting by a means likely to produce great 
bodily harm, not his expertise and is drawn for mixed martial arts; I'm not 
trying to give the jury lessons in mixed martial arts; I'm trying to tell the jury 
how a head-butt is administered by a means likely to produce great bodily 
harm, and we certify to the court that that's a critical issue in this case 
solely because that's how the prosecutor has charged this information. 
(10/5/11 Tr., p.43, L.18 - p.44, L.2 (emphasis added).) Defense counsel argued that 
the testimony was crucial to establish that not all head-butts are of the type that are 
likely to cause great bodily harm, and to demonstrate the type of head-butt, the means, 
that could cause such harm. (10/5/11 Tr., p.38, L.4-p.39, L.17.) 
The district court recognized and articulated defense counsel's argument when, 
in responding to the State's argument that the defense should not be allowed to call an 
expert on head-butting if the defense maintained its position that no head-butt occurred, 
it explained that it believed the evidence was being offered "to refute your evidence. 
Your evidence is - so even though his evidence is that he didn't do it, but he's going to 
try to refute the state's evidence that a head-butt is not a means likely to produce great 
bodily harm." (10/5/11 Tr., p.46, L.16 - p.47, L.2.) 
Ultimately, the district court concluded that the testimony was irrelevant and 
would only serve to confuse the jury, reasoning, 
[T]he question is whether or not Mr. Emerey [sic] would assist the 
trier of fact or only confuse them, and I think his testimony would be -
would confuse the jury. Mr. Emerey's [sic] expertise is in martial arts. 
This is not what we have here. We have basically two lay people having a 
heated argument and a head-butt, but it was not. They're not alleging in 
the sense of it was a martial arts type maneuver or what, and that it's 
something - and there is no evidence that I have that the defendant 
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understood at the time of this incident that - how to head-butt in martial 
arts. 
Like I said, I think that would be relevant if he was a martial arts 
person who had taken training in that, then maybe it becomes relevant, 
Mr. Emerey's [sic], but I do not - I do think that it would simply confuse the 
jury. 
So Mr. Emerey [sic] is denied. 
(10/5/11 Tr., p.50, Ls.5-23.) 
The district court erred when it concluded that Mr. Embree's proposed testimony 
concerning the mechanics of head-butts and what types of head-butts are likely to 
cause great bodily harm was irrelevant, and appears to be based on its 
misunderstanding of the nature of the proffered testimony. Nothing in defense 
counsel's offer of proof indicated that Mr. Embree's testimony would be limited to head-
butts that were only executed by those trained in martial arts. 
Mr. Embree's testimony concerning the types of head-butts that are likely to 
cause great bodily harm and the types that are not likely to do so was central to the 
question of guilt in this case. The State was required to prove that Mr. Barrera 
employed "a means likely to produce great bodily harm, to-wit: by head-butting the 
victim with force great enough to necessitate stitches above the victim's left eye." 
(R., p.230.) Consistent with this requirement, the State elicited testimony from 
Dr. Barnes, the emergency room physician who treated Mr. Ramirez and who has never 
witnessed a head-butt, that a head-butt was likely to produce great bodily harm. 
(Tr., p.278, Ls.20-25, p.286, Ls.14-19.) Whether the means employed, a head-butt 
executed "with force great enough to necessitate stitches above the victim's left eye.'' 
was or wasn't likely to produce great bodily harm was a crucial issue in this case, and 
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failure to allow material and favorable testimony on the issue deprived Mr. Barrera of his 
Sixth Amendment rights. 
To the extent that the district court's statement concerning confusing the jury 
could be construed as an alternative basis for exclusion, Mr. Barrera notes that 
Mr. Embree's testimony was a natural counterpoint to Dr. Barnes' testimony on the 
same issue. 
In light of Dr. Barnes' testimony on the same issue, the language of the charging 
instrument, and the he-said, he-said nature of the State's case, Mr. Barrera asserts that 
the error in excluding Mr. Embree's testimony in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights 
cannot be said to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, 
Mr. Barrera respectfully requests that this Court vacate the withheld judgment and 
remand this matter for a new trial at which such evidence may be presented. 
V. 
Mr. Barrera Is Entitled To A New Trial Under The Cumulative Error Doctrine 
Assuming that this Court finds the errors set forth in sections II, 111, and IV, to 
have been individually harmless, Mr. Barrera asserts that, together, the errors amount 
to cumulative error. Under the cumulative error doctrine, even when individual errors 
are deemed harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a defendant of his 
constitutional due process right to a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 
(1994). In order to find cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that there is 
merit to more than one of the claims of error before determining whether these errors, 
when aggregated, denied Mr. Barrera a fair trial. State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 
(Ct. App. 1999). 
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Based on the fact that more than one error occurred in his trial, the doctrine of 
cumulative error can be applied, and, in light of the nature of, and weaknesses in, the 
State's case reversal of the withheld judgment with a new trial is warranted. The 
argument and authority in support of the asserted errors are set forth in sections II, 111, 
and IV, supra, and are incorporated herein by reference. 
VI. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Constituting Fundamental Error In Violation Of 
Mr. Barrera's Due Process Right To A Fair Trial, When She Insulted The Function Of 
Defense Counsel During Closing Argument 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Barrera asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct, constituting 
fundamental error in violation of his due process right to a fair trial, when she insulted 
the function of defense counsel during closing argument. Specifically, she said, "After 
defense counsel's remarks to you, my concern is that you are going to be disoriented 
That you are going to be confused, because that's part of his job, about what you're 
supposed to do here." (Tr., p.818, Ls.11-15.) Because the misconduct was not 
objected to by defense counsel, Mr. Barrera must satisfy the three-prong test 
announced by this Court in State v. Perry. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review for unobjected to error as set forth by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), is as follows: 
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it 
shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental 
error doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the 
defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the 
alleged error: ( 1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists; and (3) was not harmless. If the 
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defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error 
satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and 
remand. 
Id. 228. 
C. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, In Violation Of Mr. Barrera's Due 
Process Right To A Fair Trial, When She Insulted The Function Of Defense 
Counsel During Closing Argument 
In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court explained, 
Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than 
the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted 
during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that 
evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair 
trial. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. 
Mr. Barrera asserts that the prosecutor's unobjected-to comments, in which she 
attacked defense counsel and the role of defense counsel in our system of justice 
represented an attempt to secure a verdict on a factor other than the law and evidence, 
thereby violating his due process right to a fair trial, as recognized in Perry. This 
satisfies the first prong of Perry. 
With respect to the second prong of Perry, whether the error was plain, 
Mr. Barrera notes that the challenged statements made by the prosecutor in this case 
were clearly inappropriate under Idaho law. The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly 
announced that it is misconduct for a prosecutor to disparage or make personal attacks 
on defense counsel. See State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003) ("[l]t is 
misconduct for the prosecution to make personal attacks on defense counsel in closing 
argument.") (citations omitted); State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223 (2000) ("It is 
misconduct for a prosecutor to disparage a defense attorney in closing argument.") 
(citing State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 656 (Ct. App. 1984)). In Baruth, the Idaho Court 
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of Appeals concluded that it was misconduct for a prosecutor to make statements that 
"had the effect - if not the intent - to disparage" defense counsel. It concluded that the 
statements "unfairly case the role of a defendant's counsel ... [and] were improper." 
One of the statements made by the prosecutor in that case was that "doubt is a defense 
attorney's stock and trade. They are going to market it, package it, and huckster it to 
the first juror in the box until the last word is out of their mouth." Baruth, 107 Idaho at 
657. The statements in this case similarly disparaged defense counsel and the role of 
defense counsel in our system of justice. 
With respect to the third prong of Perry, whether the error was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt, Mr. Barrera asserts that the misconduct in this case was 
particularly damaging because he makes his living as a criminal defense attorney, as 
was highlighted in the State's cross-examination of him, illustrated in the following 
exchange: 
Q. You're a pretty smart guy? 
A. I think so. 
Q. You graduated from law school with honors? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You referred to being a defense attorney. I guess, how many years did 
you work as a defense attorney? 
A. I worked in civil for one year out of law school, and then I've been a 
defense attorney for five. 
Q. Criminal defense attorney? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So you're used to being in the courtroom? 
30 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you're used to appearing in front of juries? 
A. I probably try a case once every few months. 
(Tr., p.713, L.15 - p.715, L.1.) Therefore, the inappropriate comment not only 
demeaned both defense counsel in this case and the role of defense counsel in our 
system, it also personally demeaned Mr. Barrera on the basis of his profession. In light 
of this and considering the he-said, he-said nature of the case against Mr. Barrera, he 
asserts he has demonstrated that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Mr. Barrera asserts that because he has established fundamental error under all 
three prongs of Perry, this Court should vacate the withheld judgment and remand this 
matter for a new trial at which the State behaves ethically and does not violate 
Mr. Barrera's due process right to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Barrera respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the withheld judgment and remand this matter for entry of a judgment of acquittal 
on the charge of aggravated battery. In the alternative, if this Court finds the evidence 
presented was sufficient to support the jury's finding, he respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the withheld judgment and remand this matter for a new trial free of the 
prejudicial error present at his first trial. 
DATED this 15th day of January, 2013. 
SPENGERJ.HAHN 
Deput/State Appellate Public Defender 
31 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of January, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
BENSON BARRERA 
1935 WEST LAKE POINT COURT 
I\JAMPA ID 83651 
DARLA S WILLIAMSON 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
DAVID LEROY 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
Administrative Assistant 
SJH/eas 
32 
